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The United States Olympic Committee and
the Suspension of Athletes: Reforming
Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978
EDWARD E. HOLLIS III*
"The most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but to take part....
Pierre De Coubertin
Founder of the modern Olympics
INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the modem Olympic games in 1896, America's Olympic athletes
have captured the imagination and attention of our people with their triumphs and defeats
on the fields and courts of athletic endeavor. Recently, however, much attention has been
focused on their battles in courts of another kind: courts of law. American athletes faced
with suspension from Olympic competition are increasingly prone to challenge those
decisions, as the recent high-profile cases of Butch Reynolds and Tonya Harding
demonstrate.
There was a time when such challenges were impossible for an athlete to bring. In
1936, for example, U.S. swimmer Eleanor Holm was suspended from the Berlin Olympics
for drinking with sportswriters until 6 a.m. one night while crossing the Atlantic by ship.
Her only avenue of appeal was to the U.S. Olympic czar Avery Brundage, and he refused
to let her compete.
2
Times have changed, however, and so has the motive for challenging suspension
decisions. No longer limited by ironclad rules forbidding monetary compensation of all
kinds, Olympic athletes, especially gold medalists, stand to make a fortune on lucrative
endorsement contracts. "[A]s sponsors, advertisers and broadcasters assume greater
leverage over athletes, the force of eligibility rules in their lives cannot be exaggerated."3
Procedures for challenging suspensions have also become more standardized and unified
by the chartering of the United States Olympic Association in 1950,4 and its
reorganization with expanded powers as the United States Olympic Committee ("USOC")
under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978.'
Nevertheless, U.S. athletes suspended for drug use, violations of codes of conduct,
violence, or other infractions, face an uphill battle. Assuming arguendo that the athlete
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; BA., 1993, Taylor University. I would
like to thank Jack Swarbrick of Baker & Daniels for the opportunity to apply the research that went into this Note. Thanks
also to Paul for the reminder that there is only one event for which eligibility is truly important. I Corinthians 9:24-27.
1. Oversight ofActivities of the Olympic Committee: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1994) (statement of Anita L. Defrantz, President,
Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles) (quoting statement attributable to Pierre De Coubertin).
2. Christine Brennan, The Certainty of Doubt Harding's Olympic Fate Can Take Many Turns, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 1994, at El, E2. The tyrannical Brundage went on to become president of the International Olympic Committee
("IOC"), ruling that organization with the same iron fist he had first exercised over U.S. Olympians. Johnette Howard,
Ethically, Harding Has Little Clue, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1994, at C7.
3. James A.RL Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 489,
502(1992).
4. Olympic Charter Act, Pub. L. No. 81-805,64 Stat. 899 (1950).
5. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1988).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is able to convince U.S. Olympic authorities that he is innocent of the charges, the athlete
may still not be able to compete if the International Federation ("IF") governing his sport
rules differently. The potential for U.S. Olympic authorities to face contradictory
directives from an IF and the U.S. courts is a disturbing possibility, and one that has been
realized.6
Part I of this Note seeks to examine the confusing and often overlapping authority of
various organizations to determine an individual athlete's eligibility for Olympic
competition. Part II examines the current procedures U.S. athletes must follow under the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978 in filing grievances to regain eligibility status once they are
banned from competition. Part III then analyzes two recent cases in which the current
system broke down and failed to achieve an equitable result. Part IV concludes that
congressional action to reform the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 is necessary, and Part V
urges that the recent agreement of International Federations to form the International
Council of Arbitration for Sport presents a promising opportunity for reform.
I. THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT
Much of the confusion about the suspension of U.S. athletes arises from the
overlapping claims of authority made by constituent organizations within the Olympic
Movement. "The Olympic Movement includes the IOC, International Federations (IFs),
National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the organizing committee for a particular four-
year Olympiad, and the Olyrfipic Congress."7 Further complicating the issue, the IOC is
a nongovernmental organization and cannot compel the obedience of individual national
governments! Thus, the "whole Olympic system.., operates on the fringe of public
international law," 9 relying on national cooperation and making "international custom
and general principles of international law play an especially important role at this stage
in the development of international sports law."'" While "states normally adhere to the
rules and practices of the Olympic framework and related authority, as a matter of respect
and reciprocal obligation,"' when a country is faced with the suspension of one of its
potential Olympic heroes, nationalism may endanger its willingness to go along with a
disqualification decision rendered from high atop Mount Olympus.
Nevertheless, the system has successfully functioned for nearly one hundred years.
Whether the centennial celebration of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 will solidify the
system and secure it for the future, or lead to its fragmentation and downfall, is a question
of critical importance. Recent developments have seen "the transformation of the
international sports regime from a decentralized framework relying on unilateral, ad hoc
enforcement, into a vast international administrative authority that relies on routine
regulation."'" The needs for continued growth of cooperation among the organizations
of the Olympic Movement and for the standardization of procedures for suspending
athletes are perhaps the critical problems confronting the Olympic system as 1996
approaches.
6. See discussion infra part III.A; see also Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42,43 (3d Cir. 1985).
7. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 25-26 (1988).
8.Id. at 34.
9. D.H.N. Johnson, Book Review, 60 BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 450,451 (1989) (reviewing NAFzIGER, supra note 7).
10. NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 32.
11.fd at34.
12. Naftiger, supra note 3, at 502.
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A. The International Olympic Committee ("IOC")
The IOC was established by the 1894 Congress of Paris which began the modem
Olympic Games. 3 Sitting at the top of the Olympic system, the IOC mandates that "every
person or organisation thaf plays any part whatsoever in the Olympic Movement shall
accept the supreme authority of the IOC and shall be bound by its Rules and submit to
its jurisdiction."' 4 Further, the IOC claims paramount authority in decisions regarding the
suspension, expulsion, or disqualification of all athletes, while also reserving the right
to delegate such decisions to the IF's governing individual sports.' While these claims
of "supreme authority" are broad and sweeping, they are not self-evidently true, and
without any mechanism for forcing compliance, the IOC must rely on National Olympic
Committees and governments to enforce its decisions.
B. The International Federation ("IF")
The IOC delegates to individual IFs the technical control of all aspects of the sport they
supervise, as well as authority for suspending or disciplining individual athletes who
violate the IF's rules or code of conduct. 6 Thus, the IFs are powerful bodies with
tremendous control over all aspects of their sport, subject only to the constraints of the
Olympic Charter.'"
Difficulties with this system may emerge where an IF's procedures "conflict with the
legislation or constitutions of individual nations."'" A further fairness issue arises due to
the substantial variation in procedural mechanisms and severity of sanctions imposed
upon athletes "competing in different sports or for athletes in the same sport living in
different countries" when eligibility disputes occur. 9 The resulting confusion may lead
to drastically different penalties in cases with nearly identical facts, leaving athletes
competing under a more strict regime the difficult choice of falling behind in the
competitive arena, or risking suspension to keep up with athletes governed by more
relaxed standards.
More often than not, it is the IFs that make a decision declaring an athlete ineligible,
and not the IOC. This can bring the IFs into direct confrontation with the judicial systems
of individual countries. A typical example of an IF is the International Amateur Athletic
13. NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 26.
14. CoMtr INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIQUE, OLYMPIC CHARTER 1984 Rule 4 [hereinafter OLYMPIc CHARTER].
15. Id. Rule 23. The text of this rule reads in full:
The IOC is the final authority on all questions concerning the Olympic Games and the Olympic
Movement. On all matters, including matters of discipline affecting all concerned, and for permanent and
temporary penalties of all kinds, the heaviest of which are: suspension, expulsion, disqualification,
exclusion, the powers of the IOC are paramount. It delegates to the IFs, however, the technical control
of the sports which they govern. The delegation ofjudicial power is set out in a bye-law [sic].
Id.
16. See NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 27-28.
17. Id. at28.
18. Marcia B. Nelson, Note, Stuck Between Interlocking Rings: Efforts to Resolve the Conlflicting Denmands Placed
ol Olympic .ational Governing Bodies, 26 VAND. J. TEANSNAT'L L. 895, 903 (1993); see also TAC Director Cassell
Defends His Efforts in IAffaire Reynolds, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1992, at C3 (statement of Ollan Cassell) ('Mhe IAAF
[International Amateur Athletic Federation] does indeed understand the U.S. system, but [the] IAAF leadership has chosen
to ignore it.").
19. Nelson, supra note 18, at 903.
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Federation ("IAAF"), responsible for track and field events." During the Butch Reynolds
case, the IAAF refused to appear in court at all, claiming that "the IAAF is not subject
to the jurisdiction of any court anywhere in the world."'" The district court judge
disagreed, and the ensuing litigation took nearly four years to complete. 2
C. The National Olympic Committees("NOCs ")
In each country wishing to participate in the Olympic Games, the IOC recognizes a
NOC for the purpose of being the "sole authorities responsible for the representation of
their respective countries at the Olympic Games as well as at other events held under the
patronage of the IOC." For the United States, that NOC is the USOC, which was
originally chartered by Congress as an independent corporation on September 21, 1950.24
Among the objects and purposes of the USOC is the duty to "exercise exclusive
jurisdiction, either directly or through its constituent members or committees, over all
matters pertaining to the participation of the United States in the Olympic Games and in
the Pan American Games."" Further, the USOC is charged with "provid[ing] for the swift
resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, National Governing
Bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and protect[ing] the opportunity of any
amateur athlete... to participate in amateur-athletic competition. 26 Congress expanded
the powers of the USOC upon its rechartering under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978
("the Act"),27 which includes sections dealing with grievance procedures for individual
athletes wishing to contest suspensions.2t
The USOC faces a dilemma in that it owes allegiance to two bodies, the IOC and the
United States, both of whose rules it is bound to follow. The IOC fundamentally views
NOCs as its vassals, bound to follow its rules and dictates independently of national
governmental control. 29 United States courts have recognized this duty in light of the
fundamentally international nature of the Olympic Games. 0 Yet the U.S. government
controls the very existence of the USOC, specifically stating in the Act that "[t]he right
to alter, amend, or repeal this chapter at any time is hereby expressly reserved."', While
Congress' power to completely eliminate the USOC seems somewhat ominous, the ability
to amend the Act may play a vital role in harmonizing current conflict between the
20. NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 27.
21. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1452 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
22. See discussion infra part liA.
23. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 14, Rule 24(B).
24. Olympic Charter Act, 64 Stat. 899.
25. UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMM., CONsrrT-mON art. II(C) (1995) [hereinafter CONsnTrurION].
26. Id. art. Il(H).
27.36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396.
28. Id. § 395.
29. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 14, Rule 24(C) provides:
NOCs must be autonomous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a political,
religious or economic nature. In pursuing their objectives, NOCs may cooperate with private or
government organizations. However, they must never associate themselves with any undertaldng which
would be in conflict with the principles of the Olympic Movement and with the Rules of the IOC.
Of course, one of those rules is that the IOC has supreme authority over the Olympics, subordinating the national
government of the NOC's home country to the IOC's authority.
30. DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 701 F.2d 221 (1980). The
court stated: "[A] National Olympic Committee is a creation and a creature of the International Olympic Committee, to
whose rules and regulations it must conform. The NOC gets its power and its authority from the IOC, the sole proprietor
and owner of the Olympic Games." Id.
31.36 U.S.C. § 382.
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Olympic Movement and U.S. courts regarding the suspension of athletes from
competition.32
Of particular interest to athletes suing the USOC to regain eligibility is the legal nature
of the organization. In seeking protection from suspension procedures, many athletes
have attempted to obtain shelter in the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. This heightened protection is only available if the body depriving
one of due process is a "governmental actor." In considering this question, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that "the USOC is not a governmental actor."33 This means
that athletes seeking to reverse suspensions through litigation must rely on theories other
than due process. Further complicating matters, the courts have determined that there is
no private cause of action under the Act. 4 Thus, athletes must rely on other causes of
action when suing the USOC to regain eligibility. One that has met with some success of
late has been a claim for breach of contract, alleging that the USOC (or a constituent
National Governing Body) violated its duty to use certain procedures in determining
eligibility, procedures present in the Act or the organization's bylaws. This end-run
allows athletes to gain the protection of the Act by default, but at the same time places
the USOC in a position of potential conflict with the determinations of IFs that are not
subject to the Act. 5
D. The National Governing Bodies ("NGBs")
Within the Olympic system of the United States, the USOC recognizes organizations
responsible for the administration of individual sports. Each of these organizations is
called a National Governing Body, and authority for their creation is found in the Act. 6
Just as the IFs insulate the IOC from direct contact with athletes in most eligibility
disputes, the NGBs insulate the USOC from direct contact with U.S. athletes, at least at
the first level of suspension proceedings. The authority of the NGBs includes
recommending individual athletes to the USOC for participation in the Olympic or Pan-
American Games, as well as establishing internal procedures for determining eligibility
standards. 7 Thus, in an eligibility dispute, the first decision to suspend a U.S. athlete is
most likely to come from an NGB, although an IF may declare the athlete ineligible
without action by an NGB.
This points out a further difficulty in the system. Just as the USOC is responsible both
to U.S. courts and to the IOC, the NGBs are responsible both to the USOC (and U.S.
courts) and to the IF for their sport.3 Thus, an NGB may suspend an athlete, subsequently
reverse itself upon internal review or be reversed by the USOC, yet find itself ordered to
uphold the suspension by an IF. The gridlock produced by such a situation can lead to
time-consuming litigation and expense, as will be seen. 9
32. See infra part V.B. for a discussion of suggestions for amending the Act to place the newly formed International
Council of Arbitration for Sport as the final step in arbitration.
33. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
34. Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1984).
35. See discussion hifra part II.A.-B.
36.36 U.S.C. § 391.
37. Id. §393(5), (6).
38. Id. § 393(1). An NGB must "represent the United States in the appropriate international sports federation." Id.
39. See discussion itfra part I11A.
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E. Summary of the Olympic System
Thus, the Olympic Movement consists of several bodies, each claiming authority over
individual athletes and their eligibility. It is not a strict hierarchy, but a crisscrossing web
of control with various organizations responsible to as many as three or four others. In
such a system, conflicts are bound to occur, particularly when dealing with the critical
issue of individual athletic eligibility. With the 1996 Olympics being held in Atlanta, it
is of paramount importance to modify the current system with its uncertainties, or face
a potential flood of litigation from U.S. and foreign athletes attempting to regain
eligibility.40
II. CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR APPEALING
INELIGIBILITY RULINGS
Although the Amateur Sports Act includes provisions for dealing with individual
athletic eligibility, "[t]he principal purpose of the Act was to provide a means of settling
disputes between organizations seeking to be recognized as the NGB for a particular sport
and to shield amateur athletes from being harmed by these struggles."'" The legislative
history reveals that the Act focused primarily on resolving disputes between sports
organizations, not between an organization and an athlete.42 Thus, the eligibility status
of athletes was relegated to secondary importance from the start.
43
Nevertheless, it is the provisions of the Act (also enacted as part of the USOC
Constitution) which currently establish procedures for review of an individual athlete's
suspension by an NGB. To understand how the system is supposed to work, it is
instructive to create a hypothetical situation involving the suspension of a U.S. athlete
by an NGB. This hypothetical situation in which the system works ideally then can be
compared to two recent cases in which the system failed to perform.
In this hypothetical, a U.S. swimmer seeking to qualify for the Pan-American Games
has allegedly failed a drug test administered randomly by U.S. Swimming, Inc. ("USS"),
the NGB which regulates swimming competition. 44 The swimmer denies taking any
illegal drugs, and wishes to challenge the suspension issued by USS.
First, the swimmer must exhaust "all available remedies within such national governing
body for correcting deficiencies, unless it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence
40. LeRoy Walker, President of the USOC, commented:
If we're going to have 16 days of glory instead of two months of it (because of legal delays in Atlanta],
we've got to have some common thread to get the athletes to the table.... It's got to be a fair process,
and the athlete has to believe it's fair. And it's got to have closure. It can't go on and on and on. The way
it is now, with the federations appointing a hearing panel, that's like being judge and jury. We'll get better
at this. We have to. Otherwise, Atlanta may go on from July to December.
Christine Brennan, In Wake of Harding, USOC to Take a Look at the Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1994, at B I (alteration
in original) (omission by author).
41. Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155,157 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. See H.R. REP.NO. 1627,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7481); S. REP. No.
770, 95th Cong., 2d Seass. (1978), reprinted ii 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7481; 14 WEEKLYCOMe.PRES. DOC. 1976 (Nov.
8, 1978).
43. Congress considered, but rejected, including an "athlete's bill of rights" in the Act which would guarantee
heightened protection for the right to compete. NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 206. Nevertheless, the USOC enacted in its
constitution a broadly worded guarantee of opportunity to participate in Olympic and other competition. CONSTITUTION,
supra note 25, § 1.
44. CoNsTrrON, supra note 25, app. (List of Members).
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that those remedies would have resulted in unnecessary delay."45 These internal review
procedures are not directly regulated by the USOC, and they may vary considerably in
quality and procedure among the various NGBs. Assuming that the USS reviewed and
upheld the suspension, the athlete may now appeal to the USOC.
The swimmer now files a written complaint with the USOC, and the USOC has thirty
days to determine whether or not all internal remedies within the NGB have been
exhausted.46 If all remedies have not yet been exhausted, the USOC may direct that such
remedies be pursued before further considering the issue.47 Here the swimmer has
exhausted all internal remedies, so the USOC must hold a hearing within ninety days of
the filing of the complaint to determine if the NGB has complied with all constitutional
requirements of the USOC in suspending the athlete.4" At this hearing, "all parties shall
be given a reasonable opportunity to present oral or written evidence, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to present such factual or legal claims as desired."49 The burden of proof
is upon the athlete, who must also present evidence first." The NGB may then move to
dismiss for failure to sustain the burden of proof. If this motion is denied, the NGB must
present evidence in opposition to the complaint."
Assuming that the USOC determines at the hearing that the results of the drug test were
correct and sustains the suspension, the athlete then has thirty days to demand a review
of the USOC finding by a panel of not less than three arbitrators from the American
Arbitration Association.5 2 Here, the arbitration panel considers the evidence, and
determines that the results of the drug test should be thrown out due to procedural
45.36 U.S.C. § 395(aX). The text of § 395(aXI) reads in full:
Any amateur sports organization or person which belongs to or is eligible to belong to a national
governing body may seek to compel such national governing body to comply with the requirements of
sections 391(b) and 392 of this title by filing a written complaint with the Corporation. Such organization
or person may take such action only after having exhausted all available remedies within such national
governing body for correcting deficiencies, unless it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that
those remedies would have resulted in unnecessary delay. The Corporation shall establish procedures for
the filing and disposition of complaints received under this subsection. A copy of the complaint shall also
be served on the applicable national governing body.
See also CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, art. VII § I(A).
46. 36 U.S.C. § 395(aX2). The text of § 395(aX2) reads in full:
Within 30 days after the filing ofthe complaint, the Corporation shall determine whether the organization
has exhausted its remedies within the applicable national governing body, as provided in paragraph (1)
of this subsection. If the Corporation determines that any such remedies have not been exhausted, it may
direct that such remedies be pursued before the Corporation will further consider the complaint.
See also CONSTITTION, supra note 25, art. VIII, § I(B).
47.36 U.S.C. § 395(aX2).
48.36 U.S.C. § 395(aX3XA). The text of § 395(aX3XA) reads in full:
Within 90 days after the filing ofa complaint under paragraph (1) of this subsection, if the Corporation
determines that all such remedies have been exhausted, it shall hold a hearing to receive testimony for
the purpose of determining if such national governing body is in compliance with the requirements of
sections 391(b) and 392 of this title.
See also CONSTITTMON, supra note 25, art. VIII § 1(C).
49. UnITED STATES OLYMWIC COMM., BYLAWS ch. VI, § 1 [hereinafter BYLAWS].
50. Id. §2.
51. Id.
52. 36 U.S.C. § 395(cXl). The relevant text of § 395(cXl) reads:
The right to review by any party aggrieved by a determination of the Corporation under the requirements
of this section or section 391(c) of this title shall be to any regional office of the American Arbitration
Association. Such demand for arbitration shall be submitted within 30 days of the determination of the
Corporation. Upon receipt of such a demand for arbitration, the Association shall serve notice on the
parties to the arbitration and on the Corporation, and shall immediately proceed with arbitration according
to the commercial rules of the Association in effect at the time of the filing of the demand ....
See also CONSTITUION, supra note 25, art. VIII, § 4(A).
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irregularities in the test's administration. This decision becomes final, and the swimmer
is reinstated free of all suspensions by USS or the USOC. 
3
Thus, in this hypothetical the athlete was entitled to three levels of review: internal
review by the NGB, a hearing by the USOC, and finally arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association. The system worked with plenty of time to spare before the Pan-
American Games. But in this hypothetical none of the complicating factors that often
plague real life suspensions were present. Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur,
the IF for swimming, did not become involved or suspend the swimmer. The swimmer
followed the system for exhausting all internal remedies with the NGB before seeking
review by the USOC. Lastly, the games in which she sought to compete were still far off,
leaving ample time to complete all review. 4 How does the system perform when
complications are present?
III. TWO CASES WHERE THE CURRENT
SYSTEM BROKE DOWN
Two of the most recent high-profile cases regarding the suspension or potential
suspension of U.S. athletes from Olympic competition involved track star Butch
Reynolds and figure skater Tonya Harding. The Reynolds controversy is perhaps the most
frequently cited example of the system failing to render a timely and fair result, while the
Harding case involved the suspension that did not happen, but should have. In addition
to being high-profile cases, both incidents highlight problems that make reform of the
current procedures for eligibility determination a necessity.
A. The Butch Reynolds Controversy
Harry "Butch" Reynolds is a world-class sprinter," but judging from the length of his
legal battles over a 1990 suspension, one would think he is a marathon runner. After
running in a track meet in Monte Carlo on August 12, 1990, Reynolds was randomly
tested for drug use by the IAAF, the IF responsible for track and field events.56 The IAAF
later announced that Reynolds had tested positive for the banned anabolic steroid
nandrolone and immediately suspended him for two years, automatically disqualifying
him from the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, Spain."
53.36 U.S.C. § 395(c)(5). The text of § 395(c)(5) reads in full: "Final decision of the arbitrators shall be binding
upon the involved parties, if such award is not inconsistent with the constitution and bylaws of the Corporation." See also
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, art. VIII, § 4(E).
54. Special emergency procedures for implementing arbitration when competition is imminent are found in article
IX, § 2 of the USOC Constitution which provides:
[The American Arbitration Association] is authorized, upon forty.eight (48) hours' notice to the parties
concerned, and to the USOC, to hear and decide the matter under such procedures as the Association
deems appropriate, if the Association determines that it is necessary to expedite such arbitration in order
to resolve a matter relating to a competition which is so scheduled that compliance with regular
procedures would not be likely to produce a sufficiently early decision by the Association to do justice
to the affected parties.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, art. IX, § 2.
55. "Reynolds currently holds the individual world record in the 400 meters, is a member of the world-record-
holding 4x400 relay team, and is a gold and silver medalist from the 1988 Olympics." Reynolds v. International Amateur
Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d I110, 1112 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
56. A Long History of Hearings Rulings, USA TODAY, May 18, 1994, at C12.
57.Id.
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Reynolds contested the suspension, claiming that he did not take steroids or other
illegal drugs. Pursuant to IAAF Rule 59, Reynolds was granted a review of the test results
by The Athletics Congress ("TAC"), the NGB for track in the United States, and a
temporary stay of his suspension." The hearing was set for January 4, 1991, but on
January 2, 1991, Reynolds brought suit against TAC in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, alleging that "the defendants had failed to produce certain
information vital for him to properly prepare for the hearing and that the decision with
respect to eligibility had been predetermined and thus the hearing was a sham."59 Judge
Kinneary found that Reynolds had failed to exhaust his internal remedies with TAC
before filing the suit, and placed a stay on discovery and further proceedings until
Reynolds followed the procedures established by the Amateur Sports Act.60 The court
also dismissed Reynolds' due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, finding that
TAC and the USOC were not state actors.6 Reynolds appealed, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that "[b]ecause the appellant failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies.., prior to initiating this action, the district court
was without subject matter jurisdiction .... Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is vacated and the case is remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed.
".62 Reynolds was back where he started with nothing to show for it except more than
five months of wasted time and legal expense.
Reynolds then filed for and won arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association which allowed him to compete at the U.S. Championships in June 1991.63
However, TAC, the USOC, and the IAAF all rejected the results of this arbitration,
claiming it was inconsistent with IAAF rules." TAC then scheduled a postsuspension
hearing for September 13, 1991, and after two weeks of deliberation, announced an
opinion exonerating Reynolds." The review panel found that the results of the drug test
had been "impeached by clear and convincing evidence."" Now that Reynolds had been
completely cleared by U.S. Olympic authorities, it appeared he was once again eligible
for all competition. The IAAF, however, refused to accept TAC's findings and scheduled
an arbitration hearing of its own for May 10 and 11, 1992.67 After two hours of
deliberation, the IAAF panel issued a seven-page decision finding there to be no doubt
of Reynolds' guilt. 6' Reynolds had now exhausted all possible administrative remedies.
Reynolds returned to court in the Southern District of Ohio and filed essentially the
same suit as before, this time naming the IAAF as the sole defendant and alleging breach
of contract, defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and denial of
contractual due process.69 The IAAF felt that the court did not have jurisdiction over it,
58. Reynolds v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A., Inc., No. C-2-91-0003, 1991 WL 179760, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
19, 1991), vacated, 935 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1991). "[IAAf] Rule 59 provides 'every athlete shall have the right to a
hearing before the relevant tribunal of his national federation before any decision on eligibility is reached."' Id
59.Id
60. Id at *7.
61.Id at*ll.
62. Reynolds v. Athletics Congress of the USA, Inc., 935 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1991).
63. A Long History of Hearings Rulings, supra note 56, at C12.
64. Vernon A. Nelson, Jr., Comment, Butch Reynolds and the American Judicial System v. The International
Amateur Athletic Federation-A Comment on the Needfor Judicial Restraint, 3 SETON HALL L SPORTL. 173, 173 n.3
(1993).
65. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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and decided not to appear or retain counsel to represent it in the matter.7" The court was
not pleased with the IAAF's position, quoting the IAAF's Vice President as saying
"[c]ivil courts create a lot of problems for our anti-doping work, but we have said we
don't care in the least what they say. We have our rules, and they are supreme .... ,"7' The
court then vehemently rejected the justification for such a position, saying:
[I]t is simply an unacceptable position that the courts of this country cannot protect the
individual rights of United States citizens where those rights are threatened by an
association which has significant contacts with this country, which exercises significant
control over both athletes and athletic events in this country, which acts through an
agent organization in this country, and which gains significant revenue from its
contracts with United States companies. 2
The court then held that the IAAF had waived its right to contest the exercise of
jurisdiction by its failure to appear, noting alternately that the court could also exercise
personal jurisdiction over the IAAF based upon its member organizations' contacts
within the forum.73 Finally, the court issued a preliminary injunction which barred the
IAAF and TAC from "interfering, impeding, threatening to impede or interfere, in any
way [with] the Plaintiff's ability to compete in all international and national amateur
track and field competitions."'74 The court specified this order would "continue in effect
until the trial on the merits of the Plaintiff's claims."7
This order began a flurry of legal activity, and TAC moved for an emergency stay of
the preliminary injunction later that same day, pending an appeal to the Sixth Circuit,
while the IAAF remained aloof. The U.S. Olympic Trials were to begin the next day and
time was of the essence, particularly as the IAAF had threatened to "contaminate" any
runners who participated in competition with Reynolds, thus making them ineligible for
the Olympics.76 The Sixth Circuit then granted a stay of the injunction and once again
Reynolds was out of the competition.77
The next morning, Reynolds appealed to Justice John Paul Stevens in his capacity as
Circuit Justice for a stay of the order of the Court of Appeals. Stevens held that:
[T]he IAAF's threatened harm to third parties cannot dictate the proper disposition of
applicant's claim.... I recognize that this ruling may not establish applicant's right to
compete in the Olympics at Barcelona, but that opportunity will presumably be
foreclosed if he is not allowed to participate in the Olympic Trials. On the other hand,
the harm, if any, to the IAAF can be fully cured by a fair and objective determination
of the merits of the controversy.70
TAC filed a motion with the Supreme Court to vacate the stay entered by Justice Stevens,
and was rebuffed with a unanimous one-sentence opinion: "The motion of The Athletics
Congress of the U.S.A., Inc. to vacate the stay entered by Justice Stevens is denied.""
Reynolds was back in the running.
70.Id. at 1449.
71. 1d. at 1452.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1453.
74. Id. at 1456.
75. Id. at 1457.
76. Id. at 1454.
77. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 968 F.2d 1216 (1992) (Table), No. 92-3596, 1992 WL 157545,
at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1992).
78. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 505 U.S. 1301, 1301-1302 (1992).
79. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. A-954, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3865, at *864 (June 20, 1992),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
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After several delays of Reynolds' competition at the Olympic Trials, he was finally
permitted to run when TAC officials made it clear to the IAAF that they had no choice
but to follow the Supreme Court's ruling; furthermore, the IAAF relented on the
threatened "contamination" of other runners." Reynolds made the U.S. Olympic team as
an alternate for the 400-meter relay, but the IAAF refused to let him compete in the 1992
Olympics, and forced TAC to remove him from the U.S. Olympic team roster."' Thus
ended Reynolds' Olympic dream for 1992, but the legal battles continued.
On August 10, 1992, the day before Reynolds' two-year ban by the IAAF was to
expire, the IAAF extended the suspension until January 1, 1993, as punishment for his
participation at the U.S. Olympic Trials. 2 Reynolds then filed a supplemental complaint
in the action still pending in the Southern District of Ohio, and on December 3, 1992, the
court awarded Reynolds $27.4 million in compensatory and treble punitive damages,
finding the IAAF "acted with ill will and a spirit of revenge towards Mr. Reynolds." 3
When Reynolds began garnishment proceedings against the IAAF's U.S. corporate
sponsors in February 1993, the IAAF finally decided to appear.84 It moved to quash
garnishment proceedings, to vacate the default judgment, and to recuse the district court
judge for impartiality, all of which were denied on July 13, 1993.85
This led to an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the $27.4 million judgment
on May 17, 1994, citing lack of personal jurisdiction: "In short, the IAAF is based in
England, owns no property and transacts no business in Ohio, and does not supervise
U.S. athletes in Ohio or elsewhere. Its contacts with Reynolds in Ohio are superficial, and
are insufficient to create the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction." 86
Reynolds subsequently applied to the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing on the matter, which
was denied. 7 Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Reynolds' petition for certiorari.8
Four years after the case began with the drug test, it ended with no relief for Reynolds
and countless hours and dollars spent on legal representation in U.S. courts.
The parties may not agree on much, but they would certainly all agree that the system
is not supposed to work this way. An outcome radically different from that of the
hypothetical U.S. swimmer, much of the Reynolds case took place in U.S. courts,
something not mentioned or desired by the Amateur Sports Act. The jurisdictional
questions presented remain unanswered. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
and thus decided by default, that U.S. courts generally should not have jurisdiction over
IFs operating out of foreign countries, what will happen when the Olympic Games take
place in Atlanta, where all the IFs will have substantial contact with a U.S. forum?
Clearly, the current system is inadequate to deal with the potential litigation which could
80. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1112(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 423
(1994).
81. Id.
82. A Long History of Hearings. Rulings, supra note 56, at C12.
83. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1114.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1119.
87. Robert Fachet, Fonfare-Furthermore, WASH. POST, July 8, 1994, at D2.
88. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
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ensue at the 1996 Olympics. 9 Most would like to see a system where it is unnecessary
for U.S. courts to become involved at all.
Of further concern is the reaction of the IAAF to the Reynolds decision, or more
accurately, lack of decision. The IAAF greeted the denial of certiorari with arrogant glee,
proclaiming that the decision amounted to an admission that civil courts should never
have jurisdiction over IFs or the Olympic Movement at all. 9 Less than a month after the
decision, the IAAF acted to suspend athletes immediately after a positive drug test, before
a "B" sample (a second sample) is even tested, and to require athletes to sign a waiver
forfeiting the right to pursue civil court actions prior to jumping through all the
procedural hoops the IAAF may impose.91 Rather than resolving the conflict, this latest
power grab will cause further deterioration, and may even lead to the formation of unions
by Olympic athletes bent on taking back control from the IFs and NGBs.92
B. The Tonya Harding Controversy
If the Reynolds case involved an athlete who should most likely have been allowed to
participate in Olympic competition but was not able, the Tonya Harding case represents
the antithesis. Harding, an Olympic figure skater, successfully used legal maneuvering
to deep freeze the entire U.S. system for Olympic eligibility determination long enough
to guarantee a spot on the 1994 U.S. Olympic figure skating team in Lillehammer,
Norway. Yet she admitted that she knew of the plot to attack rival Nancy Kerrigan right
after it occurred but failed to report it to police.93
In perhaps the most bizarre circumstances ever surrounding a would-be suspension
proceeding against a U.S. Olympian, Harding found herself perilously close to removal
from the U.S. Olympic team when evidence began to indicate that either she was involved
in the attack on Kerrigan, or at the very least she knew that her ex-husband, Jeff Gillooly,
had masterminded the plot soon after the January 6, 1994, assault.94 When Harding
admitted to authorities that she had learned of her ex-husband's involvement shortly after
the attack, Gillooly and alleged co-conspirator Shawn Eckardt implicated Harding in
directly planning the attack.95 U.S. Olympic authorities with the U.S. Figure Skating
Association ("USFSA") and the USOC faced a legal dilemma in deciding whether to
89. The Reynolds controversy led Swissjournalist Rod Ackerman to comment somewhat cynically: "'I envision a
new Olympic event: Process server crisscross. You'd see process servers running around the field, waving big envelopes,
injunctions, restraining orders, summonses ... and in the stands would be only lawyers."' Julie Cart, Hardly an Olympian
Yearfor Cassell, L.A. TIMEs, June 5, 1992, at C12.
90. Robert Fachet, Supreme Court Rejects Reynolds' Claim, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1994, at E2. IAAF President
Priem Nebiolo claimed that "[t]he U.S. judicial authorities have rightly recognized thejurisdictional rights of the IAAF
in the world arena. Their decision sets an important precedent for the authority of international sports governing bodies
with regard to the involvement of civil courts in the Olympic movement and in sports-related matters." Id.
91. Joe Drape, Track WarLikely Leading to Union, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 4, 1994, at H5.
92. The sense of hostility felt by many U.S. athletes toward the Olympic bureaucracy found voice in Mike Conley,
an Olympic athlete and gold medal triple jumper:
We really don't care how USA Track and Field and [its president] operate. They have become irrelevant.
... [Federations] guarantee sponsors that athletes will show up at meets. But sometimes they get us,
sometimes they don't. If we as an organization go to a sponsor and say we'll promise you these top guys
will compete, I believe they'd be glad to get rid of the middle man.
Id. (second alteration in original).
93. Saundra Tony, USOC Can Boot Harding, Lawyers Say Skater Need Not Be Criminally Charged, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 1994, atFl.
94. Elliott Almond & Randy Harvey, Harding Strategy On Track, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at Cl, C6.
95. Id.
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remove Harding from the team and risk a multimillion dollar lawsuit, or back down and
let the dubious Harding compete.96
The USFSA took a middle-of-the-road approach, forming a five-member panel to
review the evidence, which determined that Harding had violated the USFSA's rules of
ethics and sportsmanship, but reserved judgment on any suspension until a disciplinary
hearing it scheduled after the Olympics on March 10, 1994.11 Fearful of massive liability
akin to the Butch Reynolds case (which had not yet been reversed), the USOC
nevertheless decided to attempt more serious measures. With the Olympics rapidly
approaching, the USOC scheduled a Games Administrative Board hearing to take place
in Oslo, Norway on February 15.9' Harding took the offensive, however, and filed a suit
in Oregon state court on February 10 seeking a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against the hearing along with $25 million in compensatory and
punitive damages if she was banned from the games. 99 On February 13, lawyers for both
sides met in mediation with Judge Patrick D. Gilroy for seven and one-half hours before
striking a deal: Harding would drop her suit and the USOC would let her compete in the
Olympics."° Harding competed in the women's figure skating events in Lillehammer on
February 23 and 25, ironically giving poor performances and finishing a disappointing
eighth.'
But Harding's legal maneuvers were not yet over. The USFSA planned to hold the
disciplinary hearing, scheduled for March 10, 1994, in plenty of time to suspend Harding
before the World Championships later that month." Harding countered with yet another
suit, alleging in a breach of contract claim that the USFSA had violated its own rules
entitling members to thirty days response time when charges are brought and "a place and
date for a hearing that is reasonably convenient for all parties." 03 Judge Owen Panner
granted an injunction preventing the USFSA from holding a disciplinary hearing prior
to June 27, finding that the USFSA had violated its own rule
by unilaterally setting a time and date for the hearing that was just three days after the
reply was due. Defendant acted contrary to its bylaws by setting the date before it
received the reply. Furthermore, in view of the complexity of the charges, March 10 was
not a date "reasonably convenient for all the parties." 104
It appeared that Harding had achieved another victory, insuring herself a spot at the
World Championships and further embarrassing U.S. Olympic authorities by skating
legal figure-eights around them.
96. Brian McGrory, Legal Roadblocks Seen if Olympic Ban Is Tried, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1994, at 49, 54.
97. Christine Spolar, Judge Guides Skating's Compromising Resolution. Mediation Skills Bring Harding. USOC to
Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1994, at C7.
98. Howard, supra note 2, at C7. The Administrative Board is authorized under the Bylaws of the USOC as follows:
There shall be an Administrative Board of the USOC which shall have final authority with respect to all
matters regarding the United States official delegation at the site of the Games including, but not limited
to, policy, protocol, discipline, and similar matters. It shall also function as an appeal board on matters
involving team selection that are not finally resolved prior to the departure of the team for the site of the
Games.
BYLAWS, supra note 49, ch. XXXV, § 3.
99. Almond & Harvey, supra note 94, at Cl.
100. Spolar, supra note 97, at C7.
101. USOC May Act Against Harding, Cmt. TRta., June 19,1994, available in LEXIS, Sports Library, ALLNWS File.
102. HardingAttorneys Seek to Block Hearing, UPI, March 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, Sports Library, UPI File.
103. Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1478 (D. Or. 1994).
104. Id.
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Ultimately, however, Harding could not escape law enforcement authorities, and pled
guilty to criminal conspiracy charges and resigned from the USFSA.1S This cleared the
way for Judge Panner to vacate the injunction, and the suit was dismissed.'"
Subsequently, the USFSA panel met on June 29 and retracted Harding's 1994 national
championship title, then banned her from the sport for life, stating that Harding
"intentionally undermined the concept of sportsmanship and fair play embodied in the
USFSA bylaws and rules and amateur sportsmanship in general."' 7 The system finally
put her on ice, but not before Harding successfully held off an attempt to suspend her
from the Olympics and nearly did the same for the World Championships. Many feel that
in the Harding case, justice delayed was truly justice denied.
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORMING GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES UNDER THE ACT
These two recent cases make it clear that the need for Olympic eligibility law has
outgrown the current system. Commenting on the U.S. Olympic code of conduct, one tool
used in the effort to oust Tonya Harding, a USOC official said "[w]e're set up to handle
some drunk hockey players [who] go out and tear up a bar.... We're certainly not set up
to cope with this.""' The problem seems to be that what "this" is has changed while the
system has remained static. The great eligibility disputes of the past primarily focused on
what it meant to be an "amateur" athlete and when an athlete had crossed the line into
professional status. ' The commercialization of the games added a monetary incentive
to compete and win that brought with it increased problems." 0 As individual athletes
increasingly challenge the authority of their supervisory organizations, these
organizations often react defensively, becoming the enemy of the athlete instead of the
advocate they are supposed to be." If these trends are to be reversed, action will need to
be taken, either by Congress or by the courts.
The courts seem unsure of just what sort of role they should play in U.S. Olympic
sports law, however. Some judges see the role of the courts as active, protecting U.S.
athletes from behemoth Olympic bureaucracy of both domestic and international
variety."' Others take the extreme opposite view, finding little if any role for the courts
in regulating the conduct of Olympic competition and eligibility."' Still others see the
105. Id. at 1481.
106. Id.
107. Urgent, Agence France Presse, June 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Sports Library, AFP File.
108. Elliot Almond, USOCHadLile Choice in HardingCose, LA. TMEs, Feb. 14,1994, at C8.
109. NAIGER, supra note 7, at 139.
110. See supra text accompanying note 3.
111. Commenting on his suspension and the ensuing legal battle, Butch Reynolds stated: "This whole thing started
as a false-positive [drug test]. Now that's no longer the issue. That disturbs me." Dick Patrick, Reynolds Not Done Fighting
Yet, USA TODAY, May 18, 1994, at C12.
112. See supra text accompanying note 72.
113. Judge Posner of the 7th Circuit commented: "[T]here can be few less suitable bodies than the federal courts for
determining the eligibility, or the procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic
Games." Michels v. United States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring).
The 9th Circuit has also expressed such a view, commenting:
[W]e find persuasive the argument that a court should be wary of applying a state statute to alter the
content of the Olympic Games. The Olympic Games are organized and conducted under the terms of an
international agreement-the Olympic Charter. We are extremely hesitant to undertake the application
of one state's statute to alter an event that is staged with competitors from the entire world under the
terms of that agreement.
Martin v. International Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 1984).
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courts as refuges of last resort, to be appealed to only when Olympic organizations
violate their own rules, and to have limited jurisdiction only to determine procedural
violations rather than dealing with the merits of the underlying issues."4 With the
Supreme Court denying certiorari in the Reynolds case, the question of U.S. judicial
jurisdiction over International Federations leading up to the 1996 Atlanta Games remains
in the air.
Whatever the view taken by the Supreme Court or other courts, there is a strong
argument that decisions regarding this area of law should not be left to the judiciary at
all. The Amateur Sports Act makes no mention of the U.S. court system, clearly pointing
to internal review and binding arbitration as the preferred route for resolving eligibility
disputes." 5 Because disputes over Olympic and pre-Olympic eligibility have tremendous
implications for the U.S. athletes involved, often turning on quick determinations of
eligibility before imminent competition, there is a necessity for expedited decisionmaking
balanced by expertise in the subject area that is simply not available in U.S. courts. Hasty
decisions granting or staying injunctions regarding athletic eligibility issued by U.S.
courts threaten to do more harm than good despite the best of intentions.
Congressional action makes much more.sense in dealing with the problems at hand. In
enacting the Amateur Sports Act, Congress created the eligibility determination
framework, and thus should have the authority to alter it. In fact, as previously
mentioned, Congress expressly reserved such a right."6 The final Part of this Note
recommends action that Congress should take to harmonize U.S. Olympic eligibility
determination procedures with those of the international Olympic Movement, while
insuring adequate protection of athletes' rights.1
7
V. REFORMING THE AMATEUR SPORTS ACT:
TOWARD A WORKABLE SYSTEM
Within a network of organizations as diverse as those included in the Olympic
Movement, procedures and rules cannot help but conflict with the laws of at least some
nations sending representatives to participate in international athletic competition.
Continued success for the Olympics demands minimizing these conflicts through
cooperation with the nations involved. "International law typically depends on such
national implementation. Whatever form the implementation takes, the integration of
international with domestic sports law is essential to the emergence of a strong regime
114. In disposing of the Harding case, Judge Owen Panner commented:
The courts should rightly hesitate before intervening in disciplinary hearings held by private associations,
including the defendant United States Figure Skating Association. Intervention is appropriate only in the
most extraordinary circumstances, where the association has clearly breached itsown rules, that breach
will imminently result in serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffhas exhausted all
internal remedies. Even then, injunctive relief is limited to correcting the breach of the rules. The court
should not intervene in the merits of the underlying dispute.
Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Or. 1994) (emphasis in original).
115.36 U.S.C. § 395. In fact, Congress considered and rejected giving U.S. District Courtsjurisdiction over injunction
and enforcement proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 1627, supra note 42, at 7, 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7481.
116.36 U.S.C. § 382. The text of Section 382 reads in full: "The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act at any time
is hereby expressly reserved."
117. There is currently interest in Congress for taking steps to reexamine the Amateur Sports Act. Senator Ted Stevens
(R-Alaska) has indicated that the Tonya Harding case highlighted the need for such reconsideration: "I'll talk to the
leadership of the Senate and shoot for oversight hearings to hear from the USOC, National Governing Bodies, coaches
and athletes." David Nakamura, Senator Urges Changes in Amateur Spors Act, WASH. POST, May 15, 1994, at DI4.
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of law.""' While complete harmonization of the world's diverse national legal systems
may be unachievable, "what seems clear ... is the need to bring together the scattered
data, norms, rules, principles and procedures of law that do exist; to analyze these; to
identify strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the legal framework; and to offer some
guidance to assist in progressively developing the law."" 9 International arbitration of
U.S. athletes' eligibility disputes offers a particularly inviting alternative to flooding the
U.S. courts with these matters.
A. An Early Attempt at the Development of Olympic
Arbitration
As early as 1983, the IOC "demonstrated its authority to provide for the settlement of
disputes by establishing a Court of Arbitration for Sport" ("CAS"). 20 Under the original
CAS statute, the Court consisted of forty jurists (increased to sixty in 1986) specially
selected for their knowledge of sport; the jurists were selected by the President of the
IOC, the IOC, the NOCs, and the IFs, with the IOC president as honorary president of the
CAS.'2' In addition, the IOC paid the operating costs of the CAS.2 2 This, however, led
to understandable concerns that the CAS was little more than an "executive panel in
disguise.""1Za Athletes seeking "to take the IOC or one of the associations recognized by
the IOC (e.g., an IF or NOC) to the CAS, would be staring into the eyes of the President
of the IOC.'24 Even when the CAS statute was amended in 1990, it still provided that the
"President of the CAS shall be a member of the LOC.' 25
Further problems kept the CAS from being a truly effective tool in resolving U.S.
athletes' eligibility disputes. First, parties must mutually agree in writing to submit to
jurisdiction of the CAS. 26 An IF that declines to recognize jurisdiction of a U.S. court
has no reason to voluntarily submit to being sued elsewhere, and a U.S. athlete likewise
has no reason to voluntarily submit to a body that looks suspiciously like his accuser.
Second, the parties must agree on choice of law from "any appropriate body of municipal
law, general principles of law, the lex mercatoria, other rules of arbitration, or
international sports law," or by default allow Swiss law to apply based on the location of
the CAS headquarters in Lausanne. 27 A U.S. athlete seeking protection of U.S. law is
unlikely to find international Olympic authorities willing to submit to the heightened
protection it gives to individual rights. This points out a final difficulty with the CAS,
namely that "[a]Ithough the CAS was intended to have a global scope, it is essentially a
European institution"' and its "influence ... has been limited by its European
118. NAFZIGER, supra note 7, at 9.
119.Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 35.
121. Id. at 36.
122. Id.
123. Nafziger, supra note 3, at 506.
124. David J. Ettinger, Comment, The Legal Status of the Intenzational Olympic Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INr'L L.
97, 112 (1992).
125. Id. at 113.
126. Naffiger, supra note 3, at 507.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 507.
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orientation."'29 For all of these reasons, the CAS has proved an interesting first step in
international sports arbitration, but one too closely tied to the IOC to be viewed as
independent enough for establishment by Congress as the final authority in U.S. athletes'
suspensions.
B. The International Council of Arbitration for
Sport
LeRoy Walker, President of the USOC, recognized that international arbitration of
sports eligibility is of critical importance, and, if possible, should be solidly implemented
prior to the 1996 Atlanta Games. 3 ° Fortunately for him, and U.S. athletes as well, a
recent development may make that goal achievable. On June 22, 1994, all thirty-one IFs
signed an agreement to establish the International Council of Arbitration for Sport.'
This newly formed council is composed of twenty jurists independent of connection with
the IFs or the IOC, and is designed specifically to eliminate prolonged legal battles of the
Butch Reynolds variety. 3 2 These twenty jurists will appoint one hundred arbitrators to
hear individual cases, which will be heard in Lausanne, Switzerland before a newly
independent CAS under the Council's supervision. The IOC plans to require all athletes
wishing to participate in the 1996 Olympics to sign a legal waiver requiring them to
resolve eligibility disputes through the new organization. Commenting on the
establishment of the Council, one USOC Committee member said, "I'd hope this is a step
in the right direction. Everybody wants the same thing-a fair, equitable, yet independent
way of evaluating grievances."'33 The ultimate hope is that, "the fledgling organisation
which purports to be sport's first global independent court, and which talks of becoming
the ultimate arbiter in disputes, [will become] a body whose decisions will prove final,
binding and enforceable and will help to keep sport out of the civil courts."'34 The
establishment of the Council offers an excellent opportunity for Congress to amend the
Amateur Sports Act to take it into account.
C. Proposal for Amending the Amateur Sports Act
As previously discussed, one major problem with the current version of the Act is that
it leaves U.S. Olympic authorities subject to conflicting orders from IFs and U.S. courts.
Also, on occasion the USOC, an NGB, and an IF all have refused to follow a binding
determination of the American Arbitration Association rendered pursuant to the Act on
129. Id. at 508. Frustration with the administrative difficulties of the CAS led one writer to label it as "a place where
old sports bureaucratslhackstcronies go when they have nothing to do." Chris Young, Laumann Drug Episode Tarnishes
Solid Showing by Pan An Games Team, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 27, 1995, at El, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File.
130. As one reporter described:
Walker... is busy trying to put together a high-powered symposium at Duke University's law school
that will delve into the touchy subject of how international arbitration meshes with U.S. law, with an eye
toward the Atlanta Games. How sensitive and complicated is this issue? The panel discussions have
already had to be delayed a year, from August 1994 to August '95. "It'll take a year to make it right,"
Walker said with a shrug.
Brennan, supra note 40, at BI.
131. Steve Woodward, Arbitration Council Set to Handle Grievances, USA TODAY, June 24, 1994, at C3.
132. Id.
133. Id
134. lan Chadband,A Field Fitfor Lawyers, THESUNDAYTINtES (London), Apr. 9,1995, § 2, at 14.
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the grounds that it contradicted international Olympic rules. 35 Now, with the
establishment of an independent international body for arbitration that can evaluate how
the U.S. national laws and international Olympic rules mesh, Congress is presented with
an opportunity to remove the problem from U.S. courts entirely, yet insure fair and
neutral treatment of the issues. Therefore, Congress should, in consultation with the
USOC, amend the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 to provide for full, fair, and expedited
eligibility determination.
First, Congress should amend 36 U.S.C. § 395(c)(1) to read as follows:
The right to review by any party aggrieved by a determination of the Corporation
[USOC] under the requirements of this section shall be to the International Council of
Arbitration for Sport. Such demand for arbitration shall be submitted within 30 days of
the determination of the Corporation. Upon receipt of such a demand for arbitration, the
Council shall proceed with arbitration according to the rules of the Council in effect at
the time of the filing of the demand.
Second, Congress should add a new provision at 36 U.S.C. § 395(c)(7) to read as follows:
United States courts shall only have jurisdiction over controversies under this section
after the International Council of Arbitration for Sport has rendered a decision, and
jurisdiction shall be limited to the issue of whether the Council, the IOC, IFs, the
USOC, and NGBs complied with their rules for determining eligibility. The court shall
not evaluate the merits of the underlying dispute, but shall confine its review to an
evaluation of procedural due process.
CONCLUSION
Such an amendment, along with replacement of all references to the American
Arbitration Association in the Act and USOC Constitution with the International Council
of Arbitration for Sport, greatly reduces the potential for conflicting orders to U.S.
Olympic authorities from an IF and a U.S. court. This amendment requires controversies
to pass through a body much more competent to decide sports law issues than U.S. courts,
and encourages further development of international cooperation between organizations
of the Olympic Movement. Finally, the potential for review of procedural fairness by
U.S. courts is retained as a last resort.
This amendment provides U.S. athletes with three levels of review for suspension
decisions: internal review within the NGB, review by the USOC, and finally review by
the International Council of Arbitration for Sport. U.S. athletes are not deprived of any
level of review currently established under the Act, but the final decision will be rendered
by an international body with jurisdiction over the IFs, unlike the American Arbitration
Association. Therefore, Congress should enact this proposed legislation prior to the 1996
U.S. Olympic Trials to insure that all disputes regarding the eligibility of U.S. athletes
for Olympic competition in Atlanta will be covered under its provisions.
135. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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